Wednesday, August 28, 2019

On the Nyaya Account of Doubt

In the Nyaya system, doubt is seen as the beginning of philosophy. When man is confronted with doubts which seem unresolvable, then he may resort to philosophy to develop a better understanding of the problem. In his book The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge, Satischandra Chatterjee offers the following perspective on the Nyaya account of doubt:

"Doubt is not valid knowledge (prama). It may sometimes have the character of presentation (anubhava) of an object. But it has neither the mark of being an assured definite cognition (asamdigdha) nor that of a true correspondence with the object (yathartha), and so, does not lead to successful activity. In doubt the oscillation of thought between different ideas has no objective counterpart in the real. Nevertheless doubt is not error (viparyyaya). Doubt as a form of cognition, is neither true nor false. It carries with it no definite assertion of any character with regard to Its object. It makes no claim to be a true judgment of the object and so the question of its falsity or contradiction does not arise. The value of doubt lies in its being a great impetus to study and investigation. It is the starting-point of a critical knowledge of objects. In this sense it may be said to be the beginning of philosophy." (Page 32)

Chatterjee goes on to note that the Nyaya account holds that doubt is different from both belief and disbelief. “It neither affirms or denies anything, but only raises a problem for thought. As such, doubt should also be distinguished from ‘the mere absence of belief.’ There is absence of belief even when we do not think of anything at all. In doubt, however, we think of two or more alternatives in regard to the same thing.” (Page 32-33)

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