1. What we are directly aware of in our perception is the physical reality that exists independently of our awareness of it.
2. We see as well as touch physical objects, wholes, bodies, and their properties as well. But we see and touch wholes and substrata because they have parts and properties, but not necessarily because we see or touch these parts and properties. On the other hand, we do not, in the same sense, smell the flower, but only its fragrance, nor taste the sugar, but taste only its sweetness. Likewise, we do not hear the train, but only its whistle.
3. The whole is a distinct reality, created by the putting together of the parts, and yet distinct from those parts taken together. A substratum is likewise distinct from the properties it instantiates or the property-instantiations it contains.
4. Perceiving or seeing-that is knowing in the most direct sense, and there is no further basis or foundation or ground which is more indubitable or certain,.and from which such perceptual knowledge is derived or inferred.
5. This knowledge is not always verbalized, but it is verbalizable.
6. An analysis of perceptual illusion is possible without the assumption of sense data or sense-impressions intervening between the perceiver and the physical world.
7. Ordinary knowledge is neither self-revealing nor self-validating. For ‘a knows that p’ does not entail 'a knows that a knows that p'. A cognitive event may occur and pass away unnoticed or unperceived. We can neither recall it nor communicate it to others by using language unless we have first inwardly perceived it. This inward perceiving is called anuvyavasaya (inward perception). It is similar to our perception of pain or pleasure.