Nyaya: The Logic of Inquiry and the Pursuit of Certainty

Among the six classical schools of Hindu philosophy, Nyaya holds a distinctive place for its systematic exploration of logic, epistemology, and the methodology of rational inquiry. The school is traditionally traced to the composition of the Nyaya Sutras, attributed to Akṣapāda Gautama and dated between the 6th and 2nd centuries BCE. 

While the exact chronology and authorship remain uncertain, it is likely that the text evolved through contributions by multiple scholars over time. Regardless of its textual history, the Nyaya Sutras laid the groundwork for one of the most rigorous intellectual traditions of ancient India.

A central achievement of the Nyaya school lies in its development of a structured methodology for attaining pramā, or certain knowledge, about a given object of inquiry. This methodology is grounded in clearly defined rules of reasoning and an unwavering commitment to epistemic clarity.

For the Nyaya thinkers, inquiry (jijñāsā) is not a casual or arbitrary activity—it is a response to saṃśaya, or doubt. The very act of inquiry presupposes an absence or insufficiency of knowledge. If a proposition is already known with certainty, then inquiry is superfluous. Conversely, when doubt arises—whether due to conflicting evidence, partial understanding, or competing interpretations—it creates the intellectual conditions necessary for philosophical investigation.

However, doubt alone is not a sufficient precondition. The Nyaya school emphasizes the necessity of empirical grounding. An inquiry must be rooted in pratyakṣa (perception) or other valid means of knowledge such as anumāna (inference), upamāna (comparison), and śabda (reliable testimony). This insistence on observational data reveals the fundamentally empirical orientation of Nyaya thought, distinguishing it from purely speculative philosophies.

Furthermore, the Nyaya tradition is concerned not only with the possibility of attaining certain knowledge, but also with the purposiveness of inquiry. Akṣapāda Gautama asserts that inquiry must be directed toward a meaningful end—mere intellectual curiosity is insufficient justification. There must be a reasonable expectation that the inquiry will lead to niścaya (certainty), and that such certainty will serve a higher objective.

Ultimately, the Nyaya school situates philosophical inquiry within an ethical and teleological framework. Knowledge is not pursued for its own sake alone, but as a means toward the niḥśreyasa—the highest good. Reasoning, then, is not just a technical exercise in logic but a tool in the pursuit of truth, liberation, and human flourishing.

In a world where the value of critical reasoning is often subordinated to immediacy and ideology, the Nyaya vision remains a compelling reminder: that inquiry begins in doubt, proceeds through observation and logic, and culminates—ideally—in clarity that serves both understanding and the greater good.