More than 90 percent of India’s trade by volume is seaborne; its energy lifelines pass through narrow chokepoints vulnerable to disruption. Geography, therefore, dictates that India cannot afford to be a bystander in its own maritime neighbourhood. The ambition to act as “guardian of the blue waters” is not merely aspirational — it is essential.
However, India’s path to maritime primacy is complicated. The Indian Ocean of today is not the relatively uncontested space of the late twentieth century. It has become a crowded, competitive, and contested geostrategic highway. India is attempting to consolidate influence in a domain where multiple powers — especially China — are asserting themselves with growing confidence.
Beijing’s expanding presence across the Indian Ocean has transformed regional dynamics. Its investments in ports from Gwadar to Hambantota, along with the establishment of its first overseas military base in Djibouti, indicate long-term strategic intent. Frequent deployment of Chinese warships and submarines in waters close to India’s critical sea lanes and island territories is viewed in New Delhi as more than normal naval diplomacy. The result is a growing perception of encirclement — a maritime “great game” unfolding around India’s periphery.
India has responded by accelerating its naval modernisation and diplomatic outreach. The Indian Navy remains the most capable regional force, fielding aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and modern surface combatants. Doctrinal shifts toward sustained deployments, intelligence-sharing, and humanitarian assistance reflect a confident assertion of leadership. Initiatives like SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and Maritime India Vision 2047 project India as a net security provider, a nation ready to secure sea lanes, support coastal states, and promote rules-based maritime governance.
Yet, ambition outpaces capability in important ways. India’s maritime strategy competes for attention and funding with pressing continental challenges. Significant delays in shipbuilding and defence technology development persist. Internally, maritime governance remains fragmented, demanding better coordination between naval modernisation, coastal security, and blue-economy policies.
Partnerships with the United States and European navies are helpful, but limited. Washington’s primary priority is the Western Pacific, not the Indian Ocean. European naval engagement fluctuates based on global crises. And India’s own insistence on strategic autonomy ensures that no partnership can fully substitute for independent capability. The West may assist India — but will not underwrite its dominion.
Adding complexity, the Global South — where India seeks moral and political leadership — is deeply divided. Smaller coastal and island nations often hedge between India and China, driven by economic necessity rather than strategic loyalty. Influence must be earned continuously, not assumed.
India’s maritime rise, therefore, requires balancing ambition with realism. Absolute dominance in the classical sense may be neither possible nor necessary. What India can — and must — achieve is decisive influence: ensuring that no hostile power can threaten its maritime security, and that regional states view India as an indispensable partner.
If New Delhi can sustain economic growth, modernise its naval power, and unify its maritime governance, India’s role as a responsible steward of the Indian Ocean will not remain a distant aspiration — it will mature into a defining element of Indian statecraft in the twenty-first century.
No comments:
Post a Comment