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Saturday, July 5, 2025

The illusion of greatness: How Kissinger’s chosen leaders served American power, not their own nations

In Leadership: Six Studies in World Strategy, Henry Kissinger offers a meditation on political power through the lives of six leaders he deems exemplary: Konrad Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle, Anwar Sadat, Lee Kuan Yew, Margaret Thatcher, and Richard Nixon.

“Leaders think and act at the intersection of two axes,” Kissinger writes with characteristic gravitas, “between the past and the future; and between the abiding values and aspirations of those they lead. They must balance what they know—drawn from the past—with what they intuit about the future, which is necessarily conjectural.” Leadership, then, in his view, is a strategic act of navigation—part memory, part foresight, and wholly attuned to power.

And yet, as one traces the arc of these six careers, an unsettling irony emerges. Kissinger extols them as visionaries, yet their actions, far from realizing national resurgence, arguably facilitated the erosion of their own countries’ sovereignty and influence—often in ways that benefited the United States more than their homelands.

Under Adenauer, West Germany relinquished the hope of strategic autonomy, aligning itself firmly with the Atlantic bloc and embracing a tutelary role under American and British influence. De Gaulle, for all his rhetoric of “grandeur” and independence, laid the foundations of a France increasingly beholden to liberal internationalism and domestic progressivism—a far cry from the civilizational confidence he sought to restore.

Anwar Sadat’s strategic pivot to the United States—sealed by the Camp David Accords—recast Egypt’s foreign policy and won him Western acclaim. But in abandoning Soviet alignment and pan-Arab nationalism, he entrenched economic dependence and eroded Egypt’s regional stature. The liberalization that followed brought instability without real reform. His assassination in 1981 marked not just the end of his rule, but the eclipse of Egypt’s postcolonial sovereignty.

Lee Kuan Yew is the outlier—a leader who resisted Western ideological imposition. Yet, in aligning Singapore closely with global capital and, later, with China’s rise, he created a tightly controlled but externally entangled city-state—prosperous, stable, but geopolitically vulnerable. Yew’s Singapore is not sovereign in the full civilizational sense.

Margaret Thatcher is hailed as the architect of modern British conservatism, yet her legacy reveals a stark inversion. By embracing market absolutism, she dismantled the industrial backbone of the nation—coal, steel, manufacturing—leaving vast regions hollowed out. Her war on organised labour fractured the working class, not to restore national strength but to usher in an era of financial dominance dictated by transatlantic capital. Far from reclaiming British sovereignty, Thatcher bound the UK more tightly to the American imperium. By the close of her tenure, Britain had ceased to act as a sovereign power and was reduced to a "vassal state" within a US-led global order—a nation trading its civilisational agency for economic orthodoxy.

Nixon, of course, is the anomaly—a patriot by Kissinger’s own standard. His boldest move, the abolition of the gold standard in 1971, severed the dollar from material backing, allowing the U.S. to export inflation while importing real goods. In doing so, he laid the foundation for the dollar’s ascendancy as the world’s default reserve currency—transforming it into America’s most effective instrument of global hegemony. Henceforth, the dollar was no longer just a currency—it became the United States' primary export and its most potent geopolitical weapon.

The subtext of Kissinger’s analysis thus becomes more legible: leadership, in his moral universe, is measured not by the fulfilment of national destinies but by the ability to integrate one's country into the architecture of American-led order. The statesman, in Kissinger’s telling, is great not when he preserves national civilizational integrity, but when he serves—wittingly or otherwise—the imperatives of the Pax Americana.

History, in this light, is less a source of wisdom than a convenient stage. For Kissinger, the true statesman is not the one who liberates his people from decline, but the one who—knowingly or not—facilitates the consolidation of American power. His “studies in strategy” are less about global leadership than about the architecture of the empire.