Survival with dignity: India’s place in a mercurial American strategy

India does not occupy a permanent seat in America’s grand strategy; it occupies a fluctuating utility. That is the uncomfortable truth beneath decades of rhetorical warmth between New Delhi and Washington. 

From Jawaharlal Nehru to Indira Gandhi, from Rajiv Gandhi to Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and now under Narendra Modi, Indian leaders have proclaimed closeness to Washington. Yet proximity is not centrality. In the architecture of American power, sentiment is incidental; strategic value is decisive.

The United States does not construct its grand strategy around affinities but around interests. Its National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy—whether under Donald Trump or his predecessors—signal reprioritization rather than romantic alignment. 

The Indo-Pacific rises or recedes in importance depending on calculations about trade routes, supply chains, and the balance against China. India matters because of geography, demography, and its capacity to complicate Beijing’s ambitions. It does not matter because it is a democracy that speaks English and holds elections.

India’s democratic identity, often celebrated in joint statements, is strategically secondary. Democracies are unpredictable; they argue with themselves. India is a noisy republic with a free press, coalition pressures, and electoral volatility. For a superpower accustomed to transactional clarity, it is far easier to negotiate with centralized autocracies where leverage can be concentrated at the top. 

Democracy is morally admired in Washington, but autocracy is often administratively convenient. That paradox has shaped American conduct across regions. American power operates most smoothly where institutional friction is minimal. India, by contrast, insists on friction. It negotiates, hedges, delays, and recalibrates. This is sovereignty in action—but it also limits India’s elevation within any American grand design.

Yet India cannot afford strategic estrangement from the world’s preeminent military and financial power. Moral indignation is not a substitute for geopolitical leverage. Surrounded by nuclear rivals, burdened by internal development gaps, and dependent on global capital flows, India must ensure it is not positioned as an adversary in Washington’s worldview. 

American presidents can afford mercurial rhetoric; they command alliances, reserve currencies, and expeditionary forces. India commands resilience, not dominance.

If a U.S. administration adopts abrasive trade policies or unpredictable diplomatic tones, New Delhi’s response must be calibrated endurance. States do not have the luxury of emotional reactions. They have interests. India’s strategic task is survival with dignity, not posturing with defiance. 

In a hierarchy of powers, prudence is the first virtue of the rising state.

Equally important is intellectual honesty. Many of India’s constraints are domestic: regulatory inertia, infrastructure deficits, uneven education outcomes, episodic strategic incoherence. Externalizing blame onto Washington obscures internal reform. A nation that aspires to shape the Indo-Pacific must first discipline its own political economy.

The end of elite journalism: Why The Washington Post’s reckoning was inevitable

The early-February 2026 layoffs at The Washington Post, reportedly affecting more than 300 journalists, have been read by many as a tragedy for a venerable institution. I read them differently: as a belated recognition that an old compact between media power and political power has collapsed. 

Institutions survive not by sentiment but by relevance, and relevance is never guaranteed by pedigree alone.

Ownership matters. When Jeff Bezos acquired the Post in 2013, from the Graham family, the transaction was widely romanticised as a benevolent rescue of journalism by a visionary technologist. That narrative obscured a harder truth: elite media has rarely been sustained by profit alone. It has been sustained by access to policymakers, opinion-shapers, donors, regulators, and the cultural prestige that circulates within ruling coalitions. 

For a time, the Post was a central node in a global ecosystem of progressive power. Its newsroom was not merely reporting on the world; it was embedded in the ideological grammar of a world that believed itself permanent. That world is gone.

The 2010s were an era in which liberal-progressive consensus appeared hegemonic across Washington, Brussels, London, and even New Delhi. In that context, elite newsrooms could plausibly claim to ‘speak for democracy’ while addressing a narrow audience of the already convinced. The Post’s journalism often conflated moral certainty with explanatory depth, advocacy with analysis, and globalism with inevitability. What was lost was the discipline of persuading readers outside the ideological circle.

The political realignment of the 2020s shattered this arrangement. In the United States, the return of Donald Trump and the consolidation of an ultraconservative MAGA movement did not merely change electoral outcomes; they delegitimised an entire epistemic class that had treated dissent as pathology. Across Europe, conservative and nationalist movements have gained power by rejecting the language and priorities of progressive transnationalism. In India, Narendra Modi has normalised an assertive, unapologetic nationalism that no longer seeks validation from Western liberal opinion.

In this new environment, the Post’s ideological utility for its owner diminished sharply. A media organisation that once functioned as a passport to elite consensus now offers diminishing strategic value. Maintaining a large, highly paid newsroom that produces content misaligned with prevailing political realities is not patronage; it is indulgence. Capital eventually asks a brutal question: what purpose is being served?

This is not an argument against journalism as a craft. It is an argument against journalism as a self-regarding class. A press that speaks only to power will eventually be judged by power. The layoffs puncture the myth that elite newsrooms are indispensable regardless of performance. They expose a deeper failure: the inability of a once-great institution to re-imagine its audience beyond a shrinking progressive enclave.

Bezos’s decision, stripped of sentiment, is therefore rational. He did not buy the Post to underwrite a permanent opposition salon; he bought it at a moment when elite alignment promised influence. Influence has migrated. The cost structures remained. The correction was inevitable.

The geopolitics of Artificial Intelligence: How India, the US and China compete

Artificial intelligence has moved decisively from being a technology domain to becoming an instrument of statecraft. 

For India, the United States, and China, AI is no longer only about productivity gains or commercial advantage; it is about power, resilience, and long-term geopolitical positioning. The differing strategies adopted by these three countries reveal not just contrasting policy choices, but deeper philosophies about how states relate to markets, citizens, and the international order.

The United States approaches AI primarily as an extension of its innovation ecosystem and industrial strength. Its dominance rests on an unparalleled concentration of frontier research, venture capital, cloud infrastructure, and semiconductor capability. The American state plays an enabling role rather than a commanding one, focusing on sustaining the conditions under which private innovation can scale rapidly. 

Recent policy shifts suggest an increasing willingness to prioritise speed and global adoption over precaution. The emphasis is on ensuring that US-designed chips, models, platforms, and standards become the default global stack. 

In geopolitical terms, this is a strategy of technological entrenchment: if the world runs on American AI, American influence follows. Export controls and supply-chain interventions are deployed selectively, less as tools of global governance and more as instruments to deny adversaries strategic advantage.

China’s approach is structurally different. AI development there is embedded within a broader vision of state-led modernisation and national security. Long-term planning, coordinated investment, and regulatory control are tightly integrated. The Chinese state treats AI as a dual-use technology from the outset, one that must simultaneously drive economic growth and reinforce political stability. 

Governance frameworks are explicit, statute-driven, and enforcement-oriented, ensuring that algorithmic systems remain aligned with state priorities. Internationally, China seeks to export not just AI products but entire digital ecosystems—cloud infrastructure, surveillance technologies, data standards, and financing mechanisms—particularly to developing countries. 

This model positions China as a provider of turnkey digital sovereignty, albeit one that deepens dependence on Chinese technology and norms. AI, for Beijing, is both a domestic control mechanism and a vehicle for reshaping global technological governance.

India occupies a more complex and intermediate position. Unlike the United States, it does not possess first-mover dominance in frontier AI research or hardware. Unlike China, it does not deploy AI primarily through a command-and-control framework. Instead, India’s strategy reflects its experience with digital public infrastructure: build shared foundations, enable wide participation, and regulate progressively. 

The emphasis is on access rather than exclusivity—shared compute, open datasets, interoperable platforms, and language inclusion. This approach is shaped by India’s scale and diversity, where the political legitimacy of technology depends on its social reach. AI is framed less as an instrument of surveillance or dominance, and more as a multiplier for governance capacity, service delivery, and economic inclusion.

Geopolitically, these divergent strategies have significant implications. The United States is betting that innovation leadership will translate into normative power, allowing it to shape global standards informally through market dominance. China is pursuing a more explicit contest over governance models, offering an alternative digital order that prioritises state authority and security. 

India’s pathway suggests a third possibility: that AI leadership in the coming decades may not be defined solely by who builds the largest models, but by who demonstrates scalable, trustworthy use at population level. This has particular resonance for the Global South, where the challenge is less about frontier research and more about applying AI to development, administration, and inclusion.

Yet India’s position is not without constraints. Limited high-end compute capacity, uneven data availability, and shortages of advanced research talent remain binding challenges. Without sustained investment and institutional reform, India risks becoming a sophisticated user rather than a shaper of global AI trajectories. At the same time, its relatively open, democratic approach to AI governance offers strategic credibility. In an era of growing distrust around technology, legitimacy itself becomes a geopolitical asset.

What emerges from this comparison is that AI is reinforcing a multipolar technological order. The United States seeks supremacy through innovation velocity, China through scale and state coordination, and India through systemic inclusion and governance design. 

None of these strategies is fully sufficient on its own. The geopolitical contest around AI will therefore not be decided by capability alone, but by which model proves resilient, exportable, and politically sustainable. In that sense, AI is not merely transforming geopolitics; it is revealing how different states understand power itself.

Thinking like a state in an age of cautious budgets

To think like a state is not to think expansively, but integratively. It is to see policy not as a collection of announcements, incentives, and fiscal arithmetic, but as an expression of intent about how power, resources, institutions, and society are to be aligned over time. 

Viewed through this lens, the Union Budget presented in Parliament today reflects both the strengths and the limitations of India’s current governing imagination. It is a competent, stabilising, and politically aware budget. Yet it stops short of the deeper economic reforms required to truly revitalise the Indian system.

The Budget demonstrates that the Indian state has learned to manage scale. Fiscal prudence, targeted welfare delivery, infrastructure spending, and macroeconomic stability are no longer episodic achievements; they have become part of administrative routine. This matters. A state that cannot maintain macro stability cannot claim strategic autonomy. 

In that sense, the Budget signals continuity, reassurance to markets, and confidence in India’s growth trajectory. It recognises that disorder is costly, and that credibility—domestic and global—is itself a form of national power.

But thinking like a state also requires confronting structural constraints rather than navigating around them. Here the Budget is cautious to a fault. Economic revitalisation does not come from incremental allocation alone; it comes from reforming the underlying architecture of incentives, institutions, and productivity. 

India’s economy continues to suffer from well-known bottlenecks: rigid factor markets, fragmented regulation, uneven state capacity, and a private sector that is often risk-averse because the cost of failure remains high. A reformist budget would have treated these not as background conditions, but as central policy problems.

The absence is most visible in the realm of economic freedoms. A state that thinks long-term must trust its citizens and enterprises to create value, while reserving its coercive power for rule enforcement rather than routine control. Yet India’s regulatory ecosystem still leans toward permission rather than facilitation, compliance rather than competition. 

Tax rationalisation, labour flexibility, judicial efficiency, and genuine ease of exit for firms remain politically sensitive but economically indispensable. Without addressing these, growth risks becoming extensive rather than transformative.

At the same time, it would be unfair to dismiss the Budget as unimaginative or timid. Governing a diverse democracy requires sequencing as much as conviction. Rapid reform without social absorption can generate instability, which in turn erodes state legitimacy. 

The Budget’s emphasis on welfare continuity, employment-linked incentives, and public investment reflects an awareness that economic policy is also social policy. A state that thinks only in terms of markets, and not social cohesion, misunderstands its own foundations.

Yet the deeper question remains unanswered: what kind of economy is India trying to become over the next two decades? A manufacturing hub integrated into global value chains? A services-led innovation economy? A continental market driven by domestic demand? Budgets that think like a state articulate direction as much as distribution. 

They signal which sectors will be freed, which protected, which disrupted, and which allowed to fail. In this Budget, the signals are reassuring but diffuse.

To think like a state is also to accept that reform is not an event but a discipline. It involves political risk, administrative overhaul, and the willingness to absorb short-term discomfort for long-term resilience. The Indian state today is capable, confident, and increasingly centralised—but it remains reform-shy at the margins where true productivity gains lie. Stability has been mastered; transformation remains deferred.

The Budget, then, is best read as a holding operation by a state conscious of its responsibilities but cautious of its reach. It keeps the system running, but does not yet rewire it. 

That may be sufficient for sustaining growth in the near term. It is unlikely to be enough for revitalising India’s economic system in a world where competitiveness is relentless and complacency is expensive. Thinking like a state ultimately means asking not only what is affordable today, but what is unavoidable tomorrow.

At the hinge of history: R. Venkataraman and the Republic in turbulent times

Yesterday’s meeting and conversation with Ms. Lakshmi V. Venkatesan, Founder and Managing Trustee of the Bharatiya Yuva Shakti Trust, unfolded less as a formal meeting and more as an intellectual passage through time — where memory, history, and contemporary purpose converged with uncommon clarity. 

It was a dialogue anchored in ideas, but animated by lived experience, shaped equally by inheritance and independent conviction.

As the daughter of Shri Ramaswamy Venkataraman, President of India from 1987 to 1992, Ms. Venkatesan stands at a unique vantage point in the story of modern India. Those five years of her father’s presidency were not merely a constitutional interlude; they were a hinge in history. India, in that brief span, crossed from one social, cultural, moral and economic imagination to another. 

In 1987, the republic still largely spoke the language of socialism, egalitarian restraint, and state stewardship. By 1992, it had begun to articulate a different grammar—of markets, aspiration, cultural nationalism, and a newly assertive middle class.

Four Prime Ministers—Rajiv Gandhi, V. P. Singh, Chandra Shekhar, and P. V. Narasimha Rao—passed through office during that single presidential term. Rarely has the continuity of the Republic been tested amid such political volatility. Yet, as history would later reveal, turbulence was not a sign of decay but of transformation. Democracies, after all, often renew themselves through disorder.

The early 1990s compressed multiple revolutions into a single moment. The Rath Yatra of 1990 reconfigured India’s cultural and political discourse, bringing questions of faith, identity, and nationhood into the electoral mainstream. 

The economic reforms initiated by Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao in July 1991 dismantled the old command economy and set India on the path toward liberalisation, competition, and consumerism. In 1992, the demolition in Ayodhya irreversibly altered the tone of political mobilisation, embedding cultural nationalism as a feature of democratic contestation.

Together, these events did not merely change policies or parties; they reshaped the Indian psyche. The Congress party, once the natural party of governance, entered a long decline, while the Bharatiya Janata Party began its steady ascent. 

Looking back, it is evident that Shri Ramaswamy Venkataraman’s presidency spanned the most tumultuous and consequential phase of post-Independence India—when old certainties dissolved and new forces gained legitimacy. Ms. Venkatesan’s reflections on this period were marked by nuance rather than nostalgia. She spoke of history not as a sequence of victories or failures, but as a series of choices made under constraint. 

Her insights moved effortlessly from India to the wider world — from the political churn in the United States to the shifting moral and economic frameworks of Europe — suggesting that national destinies are increasingly shaped by global currents, even as they remain rooted in local realities.

It is precisely this synthesis of historical consciousness and practical engagement that animates her work at the Bharatiya Yuva Shakti Trust. Through BYST, she has devoted herself to nurturing grampreneurs and micro-enterprises — those quiet architects of economic resilience who operate far from the glare of stock markets and policy summits. 

In her view, grassroots entrepreneurship is not a peripheral activity but a civilisational necessity. “A nation does not grow only from its capitals,” she implied, “it grows from the confidence of its smallest producers.” If the economic reforms of the 1990s unleashed markets, the challenge of the present is to democratise opportunity. By mentoring young entrepreneurs from underserved communities, BYST affirms a deeper truth: that economic dignity is the most sustainable form of social justice. 

In a country still negotiating the meaning of growth, Ms. Venkatesan’s work reminds us that history is not only something we inherit — it is something we actively build, enterprise by enterprise, choice by choice.

The secret history of regime change—and why Venezuela fits the pattern

Regime change is often sold as precision engineering. Remove the leader, manage the transition, restore order. Clean. Surgical. Final.

Lindsey A. O’Rourke’s Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War exposes why this story almost never survives contact with reality.

Between 1947 and 1989, the United States launched 64 covert regime-change operations. Most failed. Even the “successful” ones rarely delivered loyalty, stability, or legitimacy. Power did not dissolve nationalism; it inflamed it. Installed leaders discovered that domestic politics does not disappear simply because Washington prefers a different outcome.

The canonical cases are well known, yet their lessons remain unlearned. The 1953 overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran produced not durable compliance but revolutionary backlash. The failed 1958 effort to unseat Sukarno in Indonesia exposed the limits of proxy manipulation in a postcolonial society. 

The 1963 coup in South Vietnam, intended to strengthen American influence, resulted instead in the unintended assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem and deeper instability. In Angola, decades of covert support for rebel groups neither secured victory nor legitimacy. 

These episodes reveal a consistent pattern: secrecy may enable action, but it corrodes accountability and strategic foresight. Regimes propped up from the outside either collapsed under popular pressure or turned hostile once they confronted the same social forces that undid their predecessors.

The most uncomfortable finding is also the clearest. The U.S. did not export democracy; it often replaced elected governments with authoritarian ones. Dependency, not shared values, produced compliance—and dependency bred fragility, resentment, and revolt.

This is why Venezuela matters. Not because it is unique, but because it is familiar. The belief that “this time will be different” accompanies nearly every failed intervention in the American record. History shows otherwise.

O’Rourke’s book is not anti-American. It is anti-illusion. Power cannot substitute for legitimacy. Secrecy cannot override society. And fear-driven interventions accelerate decline rather than prevent it. The Cold War may be over. Its covert reflexes are not.

From WMDs to narcotics and illegal migration: How allegations become weapons and oil the prize

Maduro at 2023 South American summit

History has a habit of repeating itself, first as justification and later as regret. Venezuela today stands where many resource-rich nations have stood before—accused, isolated, and finally struck, not because it is uniquely evil, but because it is inconveniently endowed.

Oil, in the modern world, is not merely a commodity. It is power in liquid form. And power, when held outside the preferred architecture of empire, becomes suspect by definition. The language changes with time—communism, terrorism, narcotics, migration threats—but the destination remains the same: regime collapse followed by resource realignment.

The latest allegations levelled by Donald Trump against Caracas arrive wrapped in familiar moral packaging. Criminal networks. Security threats. Hemispheric instability. These are serious words, meant to close debate before it begins. Yet history urges caution. It reminds us that certainty in geopolitics is often manufactured, not discovered.

Two decades ago, the world was told—repeatedly and confidently—that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. The claim was treated not as a hypothesis, but as a verdict. Iraq was invaded. Its state dismantled. Its oil sector opened. The weapons, famously, were never found.

That absence did not reverse the war. It merely arrived too late to matter.

Venezuela’s story now carries an unsettling resemblance. The charges are different, but the structure is identical: demonize the regime, compress complexity into slogans, and present military action as a reluctant necessity. Propaganda succeeds not by lying outright, but by speaking with absolute confidence before facts have time to breathe.

If, years from now, investigations reveal that today’s accusations were exaggerated, selectively constructed, or strategically misleading, the damage will already have been done. Governments can be toppled in weeks; truth takes decades to recover its dignity.

The deeper reality is this: control over petroleum remains central to the maintenance of the American global order. This is not conspiracy; it is doctrine, openly articulated across decades of strategic literature. Energy flows shape alliances. Energy chokepoints define red lines. Energy independence for others is quietly viewed as strategic disobedience.

Oil-rich states that lack institutional resilience are not seen as partners. They are seen as opportunities.

The Venezuelan crisis is therefore not an aberration but a pattern—one that has touched Iran, Libya, Iraq, and others in different forms. The moral language shifts, but the economic geometry remains constant. Empire rarely announces itself as empire; it arrives disguised as concern.

For countries watching from afar, the lesson is sobering. Resource wealth does not guarantee sovereignty. It tests it. Weak institutions invite intervention; strong ones complicate it. The danger is not having oil. The danger is having oil without the capacity to defend political autonomy, economic competence, and narrative control.

Venezuela may yet be remembered not for what it did wrong, but for what it possessed. And history may again ask an uncomfortable question: was the real crime a security threat—or was it oil?